A simple view, which dates back to Turing, proposes that complex cognitive operations are composed of serially arranged elementary operations, each passing intermediate results to the next. However, whether and how such serial processing is achieved with a brain composed of massively parallel processors, remains an open question. Here, we study the cognitive architecture for chained operations with an elementary arithmetic algorithm: we required participants to add (or subtract) two to a digit, and then compare the result with five. In four experiments, we probed the internal implementation of this task with chronometric analysis, the cued-response method, the priming method, and a subliminal forcedchoice procedure. We found evidence for an approximately sequential processing, with an important qualification: the second operation in the algorithm appears to start before completion of the first operation. Furthermore, initially the second operation takes as input the stimulus number rather than the output of the first operation. Thus, operations that should be processed serially are in fact executed partially in parallel. Furthermore, although each elementary operation can proceed subliminally, their chaining does not occur in the absence of conscious perception. Overall, the results suggest that chaining is slow, effortful, imperfect (resulting partly in parallel rather than serial execution) and dependent on conscious control.
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Introduction
The cognitive science turn in psychology has been greatly influenced by various mechanical models of the mind. Broadbent (1958) devised his information-flow description of the human mind as a communication system, while others (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1996) argued that computer simulations enable us to test hypotheses about how our mind operates. Common to all these descriptions is the notion that the workings of the human mind can be described in terms of information processing. Here, we use mental chronometry to probe one of the most basic aspects of human information processing architecture, namely the ability to perform a first processing step, then reutilize its result in a second step.
Many modern digital information processing devices rely on the so-called von Neumann architecture, within which a central processor executes one operation at a time on one block of data, and in which the list of elementary operations (the program) and the data are stored in memory. This architecture in turn is based on the notion of the abstract and general computing machine put forth by Turing (1936) , the lesson of which is twofold: on the one hand Turing proved that any computation that can be formally described, however complex, can be implemented in a universal, abstract machine composed of a finite processor and an infinite memory tape where individual symbols 
